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This paper addresses the question of whether higher levels of education 
contribute  to  greater  tolerance  of  homosexuals.  Using  survey  data  for 
Ireland and exploiting a major reform to education, the abolition of fees for 
secondary schools in 1968, it is shown that increases in education causes 
individuals to be significantly more tolerant of homosexuals. Ignoring the 
endogeneity of education leads to much lower estimates of the effect of 
education.  Replicating  the  model  with  data  for  the  United  Kingdom 
generates very similar results. 
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There is a vast literature in economics measuring the returns to education, for 
example Card (1999). In most cases, these estimates refer to the effects in people’s 
earnings and are typically based on the well known Mincer human capital model. Other 
outcomes that have been studied include labour market status, for example Ashenfelter 
& Ham (1979) and Nickell (1979) consider the effect on unemployment, and the effect 
on health has been considered by Lleras-Muney (2005) or Silles (2008) amongst others.  
These  returns  are  all  private:  how  an  individual  benefits  from  their  own 
education.  However,  it  seems  to  be  commonly  believed  that  education  is  socially 
desirable in that it also conveys benefits to society beyond the private benefit to the 
individual i.e. that education generates substantial positive externalities. These benefits 
could arise in many ways, for example human capital spill-overs where one person’s 
productivity increases someone else’s but in a way that is not rewarded in the labour 
market for example Moretti (2004). Aside from such economic externalities, a number of 
studies  have  recently  addressed  the  question  of  whether  there  are  civic  returns  to 
education: that education somehow leads individuals to be better citizens, for example 
Helliwell & Putnam (2007) consider whether education is associated with higher levels of 
social  engagement.  Understanding  whether  such  externalities  exist  is  not  just  an 
academic curiosum: if all the benefits to education are private then the case for public 
subsidy  of  education  is  a  good  deal  weaker  particularly  if  credit  constraints  are  not 
important as some studies suggest (e.g. Carneiro & Heckman 2002). 
It is not difficult to find a correlation between individual outcomes, whether it is 
their health, earnings or other behaviours. But it could very easily not reflect the effect 
of education because of unobserved heterogeneity. That is, education may simply be 
correlated with some factor (for example preferences) which are correlated with the 
outcome of interest. 
A number of papers on the civic returns to education have tackled this problem 
directly. Dee (2004) and Milligan, Moretti & Oreopoulos (2004) investigate if education 
increases  the  probability  of  individuals  voting.  The  former  paper  also  considers 2 
 
individuals’ support for free speech. Since education and political behaviour could be 
correlated  for  many  reasons,  to  identify  a  causal  relationship  it  is  necessary  to  find 
factors that exogenously vary education. The latter two papers use a variety of such 
instrumental variables including the proximity to college, child labour laws and changes 
in the minimum school leaving age. In both studies, significant positive civic returns to 
education are estimated.  
Recent work in this vein however has produced quite different results. Siedler 
(2010),  who  uses  reforms  to  school  leaving  age  in  Germany,  finds  however  that 
correcting to endogeneity leads in general to small, statistically insignificant effects on 
voting and related measures of citizenship such as membership of a political party or 
interest  in  politics.  Berinski  &  Lenz  (2010)  use  the  Vietnam  military  draft  as  an 
instrument  with  US  data  and  also  find  little  evidence  of  an  effect  on voter turnout. 
Pelkonen (2010), another instrumental variable study, finds weak evidence of education 
on voter turnout in Norway.  
Gibson (2001) does not use instrumental variable estimation but instead uses 
sibling  difference  methods  to  remove  unobserved  family  specific  heterogeneity.  This 
leads to the somewhat surprising result that education leads to individuals to a lower 
supply of voluntary labour, a negative external effect if anything. 
This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  on  external  effects  of  education  by 
examining whether exogenous changes in educational levels cause changes in people’s 
attitudes. The outcome is individual’s stated tolerance of homosexuals based on their 
response (from a list of 5 possibilities) to the statement “Gays and lesbians should be 
free to live life as they wish”
1.  
This outcome differ from those discussed above since, arguably, there is no “right 
answer”:  individuals  are  entitled  to  whatever  opinions  they  hold  on  these  matters 
however  disagreeable  somebody  else  might  find  them.  Nonetheless,  it  seems 
uncontroversial  to  say  that  tolerance  towards  others  is  widely  regarded  as  socially 
desirable and that it is therefore useful to know what factors cause this to be higher or 3 
 
lower. This paper is positive rather than normative, its purpose is to reveal whether 
education causes this attitude to be more or less likely without advocating any particular 
stance.  
It  seems  very  plausible  that  education  has  an  effect  on people’s  attitudes  to 
other  people.  Offe  and  Fuchs  (2002)  suggest  that  school  “  …is  the  first  non-familial 
context  in  an  individual’s  life  that  trains…moral  and  cognitive  capacities  favouring 
cooperation”.  Furthermore, they argue, schools serve as institutional environments that 
favour informal associability amongst peers and fellow members.  Ellison (1992) provides 
evidence that educated people are, in a particular sense, “nicer” but given the somewhat 
subjective nature of the measurement (an assessment by the interviewer) it is not clear 
how much one can generalize from this. Uslaner (1999) measures the effect of education 
on a set of eight indicators of moral behaviour but it is not statistically significant in any 
of  them.  Bettinger  &  Slonim  (2006)  use  an  experiment  (the  randomized  receipt  of 
education  vouchers)  to  show  how  education  can  increase  young  people’s  altruism 
towards charitable organizations – although not their peers. 
While  there  is  extensive  research  on  homophobia  (or  homo-negativity)  it  is 
difficult to find studies which directly address the role of education. Štulhofer & Rimac 
(2009) find a negative association between education and homo-negativity although it is 
not well determined. There are a number of studies that consider whether tolerance in 
other domains (particularly political views) is associated with education, for example 
Jackman  (1978),  Weil  (1985),  Bobo  &  Lacari  (1989)  and  Golebiowska  (1995).  An 
important feature of this work in general is that it does not deal with the potential 
endogeneity of education or the possible correlation with unobserved heterogeneity. So 
it is difficult to ascribe a causal interpretation to any observed association between the 
outcome and education.  
Other research on people’s attitudes has looked at, inter alia, attitudes towards 
immigration.  For  example  O’Rourke  &  Sinnott  (2006)  model  how  individuals  view 
immigration on the basis of factor proportions trade theory and find that, as predicted, 
                                                                                                                                                  
1 The five possible responses are: agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree, disagree strongly. 4 
 
higher skilled individuals are less opposed to immigration than low skilled individuals.  
Thus  trade  theory  and  the  endowments  of  individuals  provide  a  simple  economic 
rationale for being opposed to immigration. By contrast, it is difficult to think of any 
rational  explanation  for  an  individual  responding  negatively  to  the  statement  above 
about  homosexuals.  Hence  it  seems  plausible  to  regard  such  responses  as  purely 
representing variations in tolerance. 
The paper uses a natural experiment, the abolition of tuition costs for secondary 
schooling in Ireland in 1968, to generate instrumental variables. Use is also made of a 
second natural experiment, the raising of the minimum school leaving age, to generate 
an instrumental variable.  
Ireland is a relatively homogenous country culturally and socially. In US terms, it 
has  about  the  same  population  as  South  Carolina  and  is  somewhat  smaller 
geographically. About 95% of the population describe themselves as Roman Catholic. 
Homosexuality  was  decriminalized  in  1993.  An  act  of  parliament  recognizing  civil 
partnerships between same-sex couples was passed in 2011. 
 
Data and methods 
 
The data used is the European Social Survey (ESS), waves 1 to 4 for Ireland. The 
waves are collected at 2 year intervals, starting in 2002 with close to 2000 observations 
in  each  year.  The  data  is  a  random  sample  of  the  residential  (non-institutional) 
population aged 15 or over
2. Data for Ireland was chosen because of the identification 
strategy used. 
Since the outcome of interest is an ordered response, an ordered probit is used 
to  model  this.  To  take  account  of  the  endogeneity  of  education,  a  bivariate  model 
consisting  of  a  simultaneous  ordered  probit  and  linear  regression  is  estimated  by 
                                                 
2 Further information is at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org 5 
 
Maximum Likelihood. This is a generalization of the familiar “IV probit” estimator of 
Ameniya (1978) and Newey (1987). Specifically, for the simple ordered probit estimator: 
 
1...5 j              ) Pr( ) Pr( 1 = £ + + < = - j j j u X S outcome k k k k g g g g b b b b k k k k                         (1) 
Where S is years of education, X is a vector of controls (to include a constant), u is 
assumed to be distributed normally, k0 and k5 are assumed to be -∞, +∞ respectively. 
In the bivariate model, a second equation models years of education: 
v X Z S + + = l l l l a a a a                                                                                    (2) 
Z is a vector of one or more instruments. The model is estimated by Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) assuming that the disturbance terms u and v 
are distributed bivariate normal
3. This amounts to a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
model  in  which  the  equations  are  treated  as  independent  but  with  jointly  normal 
disturbance terms. This “SUR” approach to LIML estimation has wide applicability. For 
the binary dependent variable models, the two step estimator of Newey (1987) is used. 
I use a small set of controls: a quadratic in age, sex, father’s education in levels, 
whether the individual lives in a city and whether they were born in another country. 
The age at which individuals move to the country is not recorded so it is possible they 
were not affected by the reform. As a check, I also report results excluding those born 
abroad.  It  is  possible  to  find  other  variables  which  are  statistically  significant  in  the 
model. The ESS contains information on many other attitudes (towards religion, towards 
emigrants, the government for example) as well as characteristics such as trade union 
membership. However it does not make sense to “explain” one attitude in terms of 




                                                 
3 Roodman’s (2008) Maximum Likelihood Stata program for conditional mixed process 




Identification  in  the  model  is  principally  based  on  an  educational  reform  in 
Ireland  in  1968  and  follows  Denny  &  Harmon  (2000).  In  this  reform,  education  in 
secondary (high) school was made free for all school-age youths.  Prior to the reform the 
fee-paying aspect to secondary education was potentially a major hurdle for families.  
Annual fees per pupil at the time of introduction of the policy were approximately two 
weeks wages for the average manual worker with no organised schemes nationally or at 
school level for the waiver of the fee
4.  Taking into account the large family sizes that 
prevailed at that time, secondary school fees could be of the order of one-sixth of total 
household income.    
  The  reform,  the  announcement  of  which  had  not  been  anticipated,  had  a 
significant  effect  on  the  participation  rate  in  education.    Archer  (1998)  notes  that 
contemporaneous accounts of the policy change recorded a 33% increase in the number 
of children participating in a school transport scheme in the two years post-reform.  In 
an econometric analysis of time series data on participation rates Tussing (1978) found 
increases in enrolment for age groups that were significantly in excess of the trend in 
participation  rates,  which  had  been  increasing  in  the  period  prior  to  the  policy 
announcement.    The  long  run  increase  in  school  participation  due  to  the  reform, 
abstracting from other trends in the data, is estimated by Tussing to be about 20%. 
What is important for present purposes is not the aggregate change in education 
but the distribution effect. Prior to the reform those that received secondary (and by 
implication third level) education came from a wealthier socio-economic background.  
Thus the elimination of fees for secondary schooling had a differential effect, with larger 
increases  in  participation  for  those  from  less  well  off  backgrounds.  To  generate 
instrumental variables from this reform I create a step dummy (labelled “No fees”) equal 
to 0 if the year of birth was before 1952 (as these would not have been affected), equal 
                                                 
4  No national merit award or other scholarship scheme existed.   Some individual schools 
may have granted partial or full remission of fees in particular cases but these were 
exceptions.  7 
 
to 1 if year of birth was between 1952 and 1955 inclusive (as these would have been in 
secondary school and hence possibly affected) and equal to 2 if born after 1955 as these 
would started secondary school after the reform. Small changes in the specification of 
this variable (i.e. by one year) do not produce very different results. This step variable 
will be used to generate two instruments. To take account of the distributional effect of 
the reform, this variable is interacted with dummy variables representing the education 
of the father since one expects the reform to have a smaller effect for those from a 
higher SES. 
A  second  educational  reform  that  can  be  used  to  generate  an  instrumental 
variable is the raising of the minimum school leaving age in Ireland (from 14 to 15) in 
1972, see Murtin & Viarengo (2008). Such reforms, often referred to as “Rosla”, have 
been widely used in the schooling returns literature to generate instrumental variables. 
The effects of this reform have not been widely studied in Ireland however and it is 
unclear  that  it  had  a  significant  effect,  unlike  the  equivalent  reforms  in  the  United 
Kingdom where Harmon & Walker (1995) and others have shown it caused a significant 
effect  on  years  of  education.  Less  reliance  is  made  of  this  instrument  partly  as  the 
sample size available here may make it difficult to get a precise effect of such a one-off 
reform.  
To ensure that the instruments are not picking up trends, I use a subset of the 
available data: individuals born between 1942 and 1965 inclusive, a 10 year window on 
either side of the “No fees” reform which will also include those affected by the reform 




The basic results, treating education as exogenous, are shown in Table 2. The first 
column considers two possible measures of educational attainment, years of full time 
education completed and a set of three dummy variables for highest level completed. 
Unlike the human capital/Mincer model, it is not obvious that years of education will be 8 
 
what drives people’s attitudes and “sheepskin effects” seem plausible in this context. 
However,  it  transpires  that  the  linear  (years)  measure  of  education  dominates  the 
education levels and one cannot reject the hypothesis that the three coefficients on the 
latter are jointly zero (p=.7151). Nonetheless, the positive coefficients are consistent 
with  the  hypothesis  education  is  generally  associated  with  individuals  being  more 
tolerant of homosexuals. 
The second column removes these dummy variables and is our “base case”. To 
get a sense of what the coefficient on years of education means, the associated marginal 
effects are shown in the first column of Table 5. One year of education decreases the 
probability of an individual being in any of the four less tolerant categories and increases 
the probability of the first (most tolerant) category by a corresponding amount, about 
1.27  percentage  points.  Since  from  Table  1(a),  one  can  see  that  22.74%  are  in  this 
category the proportionate effect is not huge. The third model uses the full sample and 
does not change the coefficient of interest by much. 
These  results  make  no allowance  for the  potential  endogeneity  of  education. 
Clearly  education  could  be  correlated  with  attitudes  for  many  reasons,  notably 
unobserved heterogeneity. Table 3 reports the estimates of the bivariate model which 
controls for this using the identification strategy discussed above. The lower panel shows 
the education equation. Considering column 1, one can see that the reform increased 
years of education and this increased with “exposure” to the reform i.e. there was a 
smaller effect for those in secondary education at the time relative to those who had yet 
to start secondary education. This model also includes as instruments the interaction of 
the reform variable (treated as continuous for simplicity) with paternal education.  
To see how these work, one needs to consider the direct effects of paternal 
education.  These  coefficients  show  a  clear  positive  socio-economic  gradient:  an 
individual whose father has tertiary education could expect to have about 3.8 more 
years of education than if their father has the lowest level of education i.e. has not 
completed lower secondary education. The direct effects refer to the situation before 
the abolition of school fees. The negative coefficients on the interactions mean that this 
socio-economic gradient is lower after the reform, or equivalently, that the reform had a 9 
 
bigger effect for those from a lower SES. The effect is not quite monotonic since the 
coefficient on the last interaction is small and not well determined. In general, these 
results are as expected and are very close to those reported in Denny & Harmon (2000) 
using a different dataset. 
The implications for the coefficient of interest are striking, it increases to 0.176 
(from .0362). The marginal effects for this model are given in the second column of Table 
5. As one would expect, they are qualitatively similar to the simple probit models but 
much larger in magnitude: an extra year of education increases the probability of an 
individual being in the most tolerant category by about 5 percentage points and hence 
reduces the probability of being in the lower four categories by the same amount. A test 
for the statistical significance of the correlation between two error terms (r12) can be 
thought of as a test for exogeneity and is easily rejected. The second column in this table 
adds as an instrument, the raising of the school leaving age in 1972 which increases the 
education  coefficient  to  0.194.  The  final  column  drops  the  interaction  terms  as 
instruments and this reduces the education coefficient slightly.   
The  finding  the  controlling  for  the  endogeneity  of  education  leads  to  larger 
effects is quite in estimates of earnings effects from human capital models. Some of this 
could be explained by an attenuation bias caused by measurement error although it 
seems  implausible  that  it  could  be  a  major  factor.  Another  explanation  is  that  the 
coefficient is a Local Average Treatment Effect – the return to the sub-group who have 
been induced to change by the instrument. For non-linear models, it is unclear that 
either of these explanations is of much assistance. Both Dee (2004) and Milligan et al. 
(2004)  find  that  estimated  civic  returns  are  higher  with  IV  than  OLS  although  the 
differences are generally smaller than found here. 
A  number  of  additional  models  are  presented  in  Table  4  which  include  only 
details of the parameters of interest but for which the control variables are the same as 
in Tables 2 and 3. As a robustness test, I considered a smaller “window” around the 
event which generates the instrumental variable. Taking the first model in Table 3 and 
shrinking the window from 10 years on either side to 5 reduces the sample size to 1578. 
The results are shown in the first column. The coefficient on years of education is slightly 10 
 
higher (0.193) and is still well determined. A second robustness test arises from the fact 
that not all individuals may have been in the country at the time of the reform: it is 
known if they were born abroad but not whether they had completed their education 
when they arrived in Ireland. Taking the first model in Table 3 and excluding those born 
abroad reduces the sample size to 2450. The results are shown the second column. The 
coefficient on years of education is slightly higher (0.209) and is well determined.  
Finally, since the marginal effects in Table 5 shows that the effect of an additional 
year of education shifts individuals from the lower four categories into the top one (i.e. 
into the “agree strongly” category), I generated an alternative binary dependent variable 
equal to 1 for that top category and 0 otherwise. The estimation of the models differs 
from  the  previous  ones  in  that  it  uses  the  two-step  Minimum  Chi-square  model  of 
Newey (1987). The reason for this is that a test for over-identification (due to Lee (1992)) 
is available. The results of this specification are shown in column 3 of Table 4. As before, 
a year of education has a well determined positive effect on the outcome: the education 
coefficient is 0.224 (t= 2.97)
5. If this model is estimated by simple probit, with no control 
for endogeneity, the coefficient is 0.048 (t=5.36). One can reject exogeneity of education 
and the test for over-identification is passed easily. Comparing this model with those in 
Table  3,  it  seems  there  is  not  much  to  be  gained  from  using  an  ordered  probit  to 
examine the full set of responses over a simple binary choice specification. 
As a further test, I replicated the last model (i.e. Table 4, column 3) using data 
from the United Kingdom from the European Social Survey. The specification is identical 
other than the instruments. As instruments I use the two increases in the minimum 
school leaving age which have been used by several authors including Harmon & Walker 
(1995), Silles (2008) and Milligan et al. (2004). The results are shown in the Appendix and 
are very similar to the results for Ireland: treating education as endogenous increases its 
coefficient by a multiple of around five although the parameter is less well determined. 
To summarize, in naïve models which assume education to be exogenous, it can 
be seen that an additional year of education increases the probability of an individual 
                                                 
5 Using instead the MLE approach of Ameniya (1978) leads to very similar results: the 
parameter of interest is 0.206 (t=4.34). 11 
 
being tolerant towards homosexuals. The effect is small however. A bivariate model 
controlling for the endogeneity of education generates much larger effects increasing 
the coefficients and marginal effects four- or five-fold. The results appear to be robust to 




This  paper  contributes  to  research  on  civic  returns  to  education  by  asking 
whether  a  higher  level  of  education  contributes  to  individuals  being  more  tolerant 
towards  homosexuals.  Using  survey  data  for  Ireland  and  exploiting  an  educational 
reform to generate independent variation in education, it is shown that education does 
indeed reduce individuals’ homophobia. Ignoring the endogeneity of education leads to 
much  lower  estimates  of  the  effect.  Replicating  the  model  for  the  United  Kingdom 
produces very similar results. Simple correlations between measures of attitudes and 
education are unlikely to be very informative. 
In  aggregate,  any  impact  that  education  has  on  homophobia  may  not  be 
considered important since only a small proportion of the population are homosexual, 
although  the  true  proportion  is  necessarily  difficult  to  discern  and  clearly  for  the 
population concerned, discrimination and intolerance is distressing. Nonetheless, this 
paper adds to the body of evidence that education changes not just people’s labour 
market prospects but also how they think and interact in society. 12 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
(a)  “Gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish” 
 





 Agree strongly    609  22.74 1600 24.81 
 Agree   1618  60.42 3615 56.06 
 Neither agree nor disagree   282   10.53 768 11.91 
 Disagree   133   4.97 359 5.57 
 Disagree strongly   36  1.34 106 1.64 
              2678          100          6448    100 
 
 
(b)        Descriptive statistics for restrictive sample 
 
  Mean  Std deviation   
 Years of education   12.9469  3.308   
 Lower secondary education    .233  .423   
 Upper secondary education    .240  .427   
 Tertiary education   .332  .471   
 Age   52.069  7.230   
 Female  .554  .497   
 Father  :    lower secondary education  .114  .318   
      “       :     upper secondary education  .104  .306   
      “       :     tertiary education   .082  .274   
City  .293  .455   
Foreign  .085  .279   
“No fees”=1  .166  .373   
“No fees”=2  .420  .494   
“No fees” x Father :   lower secondary education   .129  .477   
“No fees” x Father :   upper secondary education  .127  .475   
“No fees” x Father :   tertiary education    .099  .415   
ROSLA  .380  .486   
N=2678 13 
 
Table 2: ordered probit model of tolerance variable 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 





       




  (3.52)  (5.87)  (9.68) 
       
Lower secondary education  -0.00580     
  (0.08)     
       
Upper secondary education  0.00368     
  (0.05)     
       
Tertiary education  0.0716     
  (0.75)     
       
Age  -0.00349  -0.00305  0.00336 
  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.74) 
       
Age
2/1000  -0.0317  -0.0365  -0.139
** 
  (0.08)  (0.09)  (3.10) 





  (3.71)  (3.72)  (6.42) 
       
Father lower secondary education  -0.00832  -0.00440  0.0147 
  (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.35) 
       
Father upper secondary education  -0.00583  0.00511  0.0368 
  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.80) 
       
Father tertiary education  -0.130  -0.116  0.0432 
  (1.50)  (1.35)  (0.87) 
       
City  0.0299  0.0320  -0.00669 
  (0.62)  (0.66)  (0.22) 
       
Foreign born  -0.0115  -0.00857  -0.138
** 
  (0.14)  (0.11)  (2.97) 
 
N  2678  2678  6448 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 14 
 
Table 3: instrumental variable ordered probits 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
       




  (3.94)  (4.60)  (3.29) 
       
Age  -0.0002  0.0004  0.0000 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
       
Age
2/1000  0.0111  0.0174  0.0156 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
       
Female  0.0992
*  0.0878  0.0928 
  (1.97)  (1.73)  (1.67) 
       
Father lower secondary education   -0.202
*  -0.229
*        -0.217
* 
  (2.09)  (2.43)          (1.97) 
       




  (2.51)  (2.97)  (2.23) 
       




  (3.30)  (3.83)  (2.87) 
       
City  0.0244  0.0227  0.0234 
  (0.51)  (0.48)  (0.49) 
       
Foreign born  -0.0831  -0.0938  -0.0893 
  (1.01)  (1.15)  (1.06) 
Years education 
 
     




  (4.78)  (4.68)  (3.95) 
       




  (6.05)  (3.53)  (2.75) 
       
Father lower secondary education x  -0.608
**  -0.595
**   
“No fees”  (3.24)  (3.21)   
       
Father upper secondary education x  -0.698
***  -0.703
***   
“No fees”  (3.57)  (3.66)   15 
 
       
Father tertiary education x  -0.244  -0.240   
“No fees”  (1.07)  (1.08)   
       
       
Raising of school leaving age (ROSLA)    0.544  0.472 
    (1.83)  (1.55) 
       
Age  -0.0242  0.0400  0.0596 
  (0.20)  (0.31)  (0.46) 
       
Age
2/1000  0.407  -0.145  -0.334 
  (0.35)  (0.12)  (0.27) 





  (2.94)  (2.96)  (2.91) 
       




  (7.54)  (7.53)  (7.69) 
       




  (11.73)  (11.81)  (13.95) 
       




  (11.08)  (11.21)  (16.20) 
       
City  0.0473  0.0509  0.0501 
  (0.37)  (0.39)  (0.39) 
       




  (2.57)  (2.53)  (2.38) 





  (3.43)  (2.75)  (2.64) 





  (79.83)  (79.81)  (80.05) 





  (3.51)  (2.96)  (2.48) 
       
N  2678  2678  2678 
 Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. s1 =1 
(normalized). 16 
 
Table 4: Additional models 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Binary 
  +/-5 yr window  No foreign  probit 
       




  (4.15)  (4.85)  (2.97) 
       
Years education 
 
     




  (4.01)  (4.30)  (5.30) 
       




  (5.15)  (5.65)  (5.85) 
       
Father lower secondary education x  -0.650
**  -0.617
**  -0.614 
“No fees”  (2.46)  (3.15)  (3.08) 
       
Father upper secondary education x  -0.928
***  -0.576
***  -0.646 
“No fees”  (3.59)  (2.95)  (3.08) 
       
Father tertiary education x  0.166  0.166  -0.318 
“No fees”  (0.53)  (0.69)  (1.31) 
       
       
Ln s2       
  1.090
***  1.08
***   
  (61.24)  (75.56)   
r12       
  -0.468
**  -0.501
**   
  (3.15)  (3.63)   
Wald test of exogeneity c
2(1) 
P-value 





    3.185 
0.527 
N  1578  2450  2678 
 Absolute  t  statistics  in  parentheses. 
*  p  <  0.05, 
**  p  <  0.01, 
***  p  <  0.001.  s1  =1 
(normalized).  All  models  contain  the  same  covariates  as  in  Tables  2  and  3,  details 
available on request. The dependent variable in column 3 is a binary variable equal to 1 




Table 5: Marginal effect of one year of education 
 
“Gays and lesbians should be free 
to live life as they wish” 
(1) 
Table 2, col. 2 
(2) 
Table 3, col. 1 
 
Agree strongly  .0127  .0507   
  (5.62)  (5.18)   
       
Agree  -.0023  -.0045   
  (3.67)  (2.69)   
       
Neither agree nor disagree  -.0053  -.0175   
  (5.45)  (9.44)   
       
Disagree   -.0037  -.0167   
  (5.18)  (3.84)   








Absolute t ratios in parentheses. Coefficients show the effect of an increase in one year 
of education on the probability of each of the five outcomes occurring.  Note that .05  
corresponds to 5 percentage points. Column totals may not add to zero due to rounding. 
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Appendix: replication for the United Kingdom 
 
The table below replicates the model shown in Table 4, column 3 where the dependent 
variable is a binary variable equal to one for the top category (the “agree strongly” 
response) and is zero otherwise using the United Kingdom data from the same data 
source, the ESS. The covariates (a quadratic in age, sex, paternal education, living in a 
city and foreign born) are the same. The instruments are the raising of the minimum 
school leaving age (from 14 to 15) generated by legislation in 1944 (England and Wales) 
and 1945 (Scotland) – this is “Rosla 1” and a further increase (from 15 to 16) in 1973 
(England, Wales and Northern Ireland) and 1976 (Scotland) – this is “Rosla 2”. 
 
Table A1  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  +/- 10 yr window  +/-5 year window 
  Probit  IV probit  Probit  IV probit 
         
Years education  0.0416
***  0.242
*  0.0418
***  0.184 
  (6.73)  (2.13)  (6.11)  (1.84) 
Years education 
 
       
Rosla 1    0.512
**    0.586
** 
    (2.91)    (3.06) 
         
Rosla 2    0.641
**    0.542
** 
    (3.46)    (2.58) 
 
Wald test of exogeneity c
2(1) 
p-value 
  3.75 
0.0527 





  0.141 
0.7074 
  1.768 
0.1836 
 
N  5261  4252 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses. Model specification is identical to Table 4, column 3.  
Coefficients on the other variables are available on request.  
 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
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